The Economic Growth Centre in the Division of Economics School of Humanities and Social Sciences, NTU cordially invites you to a seminar by Professor Winand Emons

**Speaker:**
**Professor Winand Emons**  
*Professor of Economic Theory*  
*University of Bern*

**Topic:**
"Conditional Versus Contingent Fees"

**Chairperson:**
**Associate Professor Tan Khye Chong**  
*Lecturer, Division of Economics*  
*School of Humanities and Social Sciences*

**Date:**
Wednesday, 15 March 2006

**Time:**
2:45 pm - 4:15 pm

**Venue:**
Executive Seminar Room 10 (S3.1-B2-11)  
Nanyang Business School (Southspine 3)  
Nanyang Technological University

**About the Speaker:**
Professor Winand Emons is currently Professor of Economic Theory at the University of Bern. He obtained his PhD in Economics from the University of Bonn in 1986. Professor Emons has been a Visiting Professor to various universities including University of California in San Diego and Berkeley, Tilburg University, and Purdue University. His research interests include economics of uncertainty and information, industrial organization, law and economics, and international trade. He is presently a Research Fellow in the Industrial Organization Programme of the Centre for Economic Policy Research and an Associate Editor of the Journal of Industrial Economics and European Economic Review. In addition, he serves as a member of the editorial board of the International Review of Law and Economics (since 1988), the Review of Law and Economics (since 2004), and the European Journal of Political Economy (1994 – 2000).

**Abstract:**
Under contingent fees the attorney gets a share of the judgement; under conditional fees the lawyer gets an upscale premium if the case is won which is, however, unrelated to the adjudicated amount. We compare conditional and contingent fees in a framework where lawyers are uninformed about the clients’ cases. If there is asymmetric information about the expected level of adjudication, in equilibrium attorneys will offer only conditional fees. If there is asymmetric information about the risk of cases, only contingent fee contracts are offered in equilibrium.

**Reservation:**
Admission is free. Please reply to Christina, mailto: achristina@ntu.edu.sg or Tel: 6790-5689 to confirm your attendance.